Labor Law: NLRB Permits Agency Shop Union to Sue Members to Collect Fines Implementing a Production-Ceiling by unknown
LABOR LAW: NLRB PERMITS AGENCY SHOP UNION TO
SUE MEMBERS TO COLLECT FINES IMPLEMENTING
A PRODUCTION-CEILING
THE National Labor Relations Board's most flexible weapon
to circumscribe union unfair labor practices in section
8 (b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibits "restraint and
coercion" of the employee in the exercise of his right to refrain from
union activity.1 In a proviso to that section, however, Congress ex-
plicitly refused to extend the unfair practice restrictions into the
internal affairs of unions.2 The Board relied upon this proviso
in Local 283, UA W3 to support its decision that a suit for collection
of fines imposed by an agency shop union on its members for failure
to adhere to a production-ceiling by-law was not a section (8) (b) (1)
(A) violation.
The by-law in question limited the amount of incentive pay
union members could receive in any pay period.4 They were not
forced to stop working when they reached the ceiling level but could
"bank" earnings from excess production and draw upon the bank
when individual output fell below the permissible maximum. The
banking procedure was an effective stimulus to under-production for
"See Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955); Note, 44 VA. L. RvV. 741,
742 (1958).
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 157 ...:
Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership
therein. . . . Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8 (b) (1) (A), 61
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) (1958).
Section 157 of the act states: "Employees shall ...also have the right to refrain
from any or all activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 8(a)(3)." (Emphasis added.) 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1958).
2 See note 1 supra.
3 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. 12835 (145 N.L.R.B. No. 109, Jan. 17, 1964).
Although nonmember employees were not governed by the union rules, a security
clause in the collective agreement established an agency shop arrangement whereby
all employees were required to support the union. The monthly service fee paid by
the nonmember could not exceed the monthly dues of the union member. Id. at
20389 (dissenting opinion).
About one half of the plant employees worked on a piecework basis under which
they could earn more than the machine rate provided for in the collective agreement.
The ceilings promulgated by the union ranged between forty-five and fifty cents an
hour above the machine rate. Id. at 20384.
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workers who could substantially avoid lay-offs, sick leave, and me-
chanical difficulties. While the company placed no limits on em-
ployee earnings, it voluntarily cooperated in the administration of
the banking system.6 In fact, these ceilings were considered in the
negotiation and operation of the plant wage structure.7
The petitioners, all union members, were fined for repeatedly
drawing more than the maximum pay allowable under the ceiling
rule. State court litigation was then instituted by the union to col-
lect the fines." Subsequently, the instant complaint was filed alleging
that the employees' right to refrain from union activity was being
restrained by the unilaterally imposed ceilings and by the union's
attempt to collect the fines through means other than internal pro-
cedures. 9 A majority of the Board dismissed the petition on the
basis that the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A) expressly allows the
establishment of labor organization rules with respect to member-
ship and therefore protects this by-law which deals with a legitimate
member interest. The opinion also indicated that the range of sec-
tion 8 (b) (1) (A) was limited to acts of violence, intimidation and
reprisal and would not be extended to proscribe generat economic
pressures. Two members took exception to deciding the case on
either of the above grounds, one concurring in the result by finding
that the complaining parties were not in fact coerced, as they had
voluntarily joined the union.
The NLRB limited the application of section 8 (b) (1) (A) for a
decade after its inception to cases involving the harsher forms of
oppressive union tactics.10 In 1957 the Eisenhower Board varied
""The record shows that . . . an employee can reach the production ceiling in
five hours, and that employees have read books, played cards, and talked in the
remaining time." Id. at 20389 (dissenting opinion).
0 The company maintains bookkeeping records in accordance with the system;
allows the union access to the records; pays the union stewards for the time expended
in checking the records; and does not discipline the employees for not producing in
excess of the ceilings. Id. at 20385.
7 Ibid.
'No evidence as to the outcome of these suits was before the Board.
'In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954), the Board held
that a union fine was permissible activity. The one distinction between the instant
case and Minneapolis Star & Tribune is the fact that the union brought suit on the fine.
10 GREcORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 557 (2d rev. ed., Supp. 1961); 1959 DUKE L.J.
624; Comment, 34 WASH. L. Rlv. 421 (1959). See, e.g., Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 116 N.L.R.B. 842 (1956) (violence); International Woodworkers, 116 N.L.R.B.
507 (1956), enforced, 243 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1957) (threats of violence); Local 140,
United Furniture Workers, 113 N.L.R.B. 815 (1955), enforced, 233 F.2d 539 (2d Cir.
1956) (mass picketing); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1953), enforced,
215 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1954) (economic reprisal).
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from this pattern in holding that peaceful picketing by a minority
union was a violation of the section. 1 Although the Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal of the Board's position,'12 the principle that non-
violent and traditional union acts can be violative of section 8 (b)
(1) (A) later received clear Supreme Court endorsement in Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard Alt-
man).13 The majority's adoption of the trial examiner's conclusion
that section 8 (b) (1) (A) even without the proviso does not apply to
the kind of coercion which results from the application of internal
discipline is in apparent conflict with the Bernhard Altman reason-
ing.' 4 A clearer understanding of the scope of the section would have
resulted had the majority rejected or explained this conclusion."
Instead, they avoided a determination of the effect of the broad
During this time the Board held that by section 8 (b) (1) (A) "Congress was aiming
at means, not at ends." Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.LR.B. 225, 239 (1948). The reluctance
to proscribe traditional union activity was an incentive to the narrow interpretation
the Board had given § 8 (b) (1) (A). Note, 44 VA. L. Rxv. 741, 744-45 (1958).
11 Drivers, Local 639, 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957), revtd., 274 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
aff'd, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). See also International Ass'n of Machinists, 119 N.L.R.B.
307 (1957), modified, 263 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1959).
12 NLRB v. Drivers' Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). The issue in the Supreme Court
decision was complicated by the addition to the Taft-Hartley law of § 8 (b) (7), 73
Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV, 1959-1962), which expressly prohibited
the conduct which the Board had found was violative of § 8 (b) (1) (A). As one com-
mentator noted: "Not unreasonably a majority . . . realized that if they upheld the
Board in its Curtis decision, then there would be two sets of rules covering the same
conduct-organizational or recognition picketing-in different ways." GPEGoRY, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 558-59.
12366 U.S. 731 (1961).
In this case the union was held to have restrained employees unlawfully by
executing an agreement to act as exclusive representative when only a minority of
the workers had authorized the union to represent their interests.
14 CCH LAB. L. RE'. 12835, at 20385-86.
12 One narrow distinction which might be drawn between the present case and
Bernhard Altman is that § 8(b)(1) (A) was intended to cover physical violence and
reprisal, whether applied directly or indirectly against the employee, and economic
pressure, but only when applied indirectly through the employer. Comment, 34 WAst.
L. REv. 421, 431 (1959).
The majority draws no distinction, and seems to be advancing the questionable
proposition that the section without the proviso is equivalent to the section with the
proviso. The bases of this argument are the statements of Senator Ball, a sponsor of
the Taft-Hartley Act, quoted in the majority opinion: "It was never the intent of
the sponsors of the amendment to interfere with the internal affairs or organization
of unions." And later: "All we are trying to do is cover the coercive and restraining
acts of the union in its efforts to organize unorganized employees." 4 CCH LAB. L.
RP,. at 20386. But, in fact, the Board has not always accepted the words of the
sponsors as decisive. The prohibitions of § 8 (b) (1) (A) have not been limitcd to purely
organizational situations. Gimbel Bros., 100 N.L.R.B. 870 (1952). See generally 93
CONG. REc. 4130-50 (1947) (Senate debate); 93 CONG. REc. 6361, 6373-77 (1947) (joint
conference report); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1947).
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language in Bernhard Altman 6 by finding that the fines were per-
missible activity within the proviso.
The dissenting member, after maintaining that the fines levied
by the union did constitute restraint and coercion, argued mainly
that the proviso was not applicable in this case because the subject
matter of the by-law was of "mutual concern" to the employees and
the employer. The mutual concern doctrine arose in Allen Bradley
Co. v. NLRBy'7 a case in which the Board does not acquiesce. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned in Allen Bradley that
when the substance of a union rule went beyond membership and
dealt with the employment relationship, a union penalty against
those members who did not observe the rule would be an infringe-
ment of the employee's right to abstain from unionism.'8
Considering the role of the ceilings in the collective negotiations
and the company's cooperation in the banking procedure, one could
argue that the by-law in the instant case was quasi-contractual., At
the very least, the employer's acts are indictive of a knowing conces-
sion of some of management's prerogatives in production setting.
Therefore, since the mutual concern doctrine certainly does not
encompass union sanctions of members for refusal to adhere to'the
terms and conditions of the collective bargaining agreement, 9 this
decision is reconcilable with the Allen Bradley dicta. However, t6
defend the instant case on this narrow ground would have the in-
nocuous effect of union insistence that its internal regulations be
10 "It was the intent of Congress to impose upon unions the same restrictions
which the Wagner Act imposed upon employers .... ." 366 U.S. at 738. Contra,
National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950) (comparison of § 8(b) (1) (A) and § 8 (a) (1),
the general provision proscribing employer unfair practices); see Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 89 N.L.R.B. 894 (1950).
117286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961), reversing 127 N.L.R.B. 44 (1960).
"8 The Allen Bradley case primarily held that the proviso to § 8 (b) (1) (A) did not
eliminate as a proper subject for collective bargaining a company proposal to limit
the union's right to discipline members. After overturning the Board's finding of an
employer unfair practice for refusal to bargain, the court in dicta stated that enforcing
a rule which is any way deprives a member of the right to work whether by "fine,
discharge or otherwise" is unlawfully coercive. 286 F.2d at 446.
It is undisputed that where the sanctions imposed on the violators of union rules
affect the employment status the union is committing an unfair practice. See United
Stone Workers, 121 N.L.R.B. 914 (1958) (threat to job tenure); National Lead Co.,
106 N.L.R.B. 545 (1953) (discharge from employment for failure to pay fines).
10 See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 6 HARV. L. Rav. 1049 (1951).
If the union cannot restrain an employee who refuses to work union hours or for
union wages, the whole concept of exclusive representation would be thereby invali-
dated.
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incorporated in the collective agreement. The end product in fields
of union strength would merely be codification of present union
rules.2 ° In the less organized industries the Allen Bradley approach
adopted by the dissent and inherent in the above distinction would
emasculate intra-union sanctions imposed to present a united eco-
nomic front.21
A second basis suggested 22 for finding that the fine did not come
within the proviso is that the fine was not enforced by internal pro-
cedures alone, but was made collectible as a debt.28 To counter this
argument the majority asserts that nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended to prohibit unions from using the
courts to collect disciplinary fines. 24 However, the congressional ob-
jective in including the proviso was not to sanctify the provisions of
,the membership arrangement or union activity arising thereunder. 25
Thus, had petitioners been faced solely with the alternative of pay-
20 In practice, most existing union rules which are of concern to the employer are
already subject to negotiation. The history of the ceilings in the negotiations between
this employer and union is illustrative. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 20385. The union is
under a legal obligation to bargain in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment. Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140, 143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b) (3), 159 (a) (1958). Furthermore, bargaining need not be confined
to statutory subjects. N.L.R.B. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 842 (1958); cf. Van
de Water, The Broader Effects of the Taft-Hartley Act on Make-Work Practices in
Industry, 3 U.C.LA. L. REv. 27 (1955). Compare note 18 supra.
2 See Summers, supra note 19, at 1049, 1064; 1962 DUKE L.J. 468, 471.
22 This was the argument of the General Counsel.
28 See UAW v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958). Contra. Local 248,
UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 11 Wis. 277, 105 N.W.2d 271 (1960).
There is a federal pre-emption problem in a state court's taking jurisdiction of a suit
when the rights of the parties may rest upon whether or not an unfair labor practice
was committed. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
2 The legislative evidence includes the passage of the Labor-Management Report-
ing and Disclosure Act of 1959 with more stringent restrictions on expulsion than on
union fines. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. IV, 1959-1962).
21See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 96 N.L.R.B. 522 (1951), enforced, 203 F.2d 173
(9th Cir. 1953); Eclipse Lumber Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 464 (1951), enforced, 199 F.2d 684
(9th Cir. 1952); Electric Auto Lite Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1950), enforced per curiam,
196 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 823 (1953); Note, 45 GEo. L.J. 250,
251-52 (1956); cf. Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 123 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1959);
Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883
(1957). Contra, American Newspapers Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 782 (7th
Cir. 1951).
Since internal union discipline is based upon contract theory, International Ass'n
of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), one can argue that the purpose of
the proviso was to reaffirm the common law doctrine that the courts would not
interfere with the right of a union and its constituents, as separate entities, to make
a membership contract. See Feinne v. Monahan, 196 Misc. 407, 92 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup.
Ct. 1949); 1962 DUm L.J. 468, 469. But see James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 321,
155 P.2d 329 (1944) (unions cannot arbitrarily exclude individuals on racial basis);
Summers, supra note 19, at 1054-55, 1057-58 (critical of the contract theory).
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ing the fine or being subject to the union's unquestioned power of
explusion,26 they would have been restrained by union discipline
only in the sense exempted by the proviso. But, when the union
sought the aid of the courts to collect the fines, the members were
restrained by pressures beyond the internal mechanisms, and there
is no statutory language to absolve such a suit of its potentially
coercive character. 27 The mere existence of a by-law, even one per-
taining to a legitimate member concern, should not alone be determ-
inative of the legality of union conduct.2
To say that suit for the collection of a fine is not exempted by
the proviso without first determining whether a member who had
the option of rejecting union membership can be coerced by a union
fine is reversing the scheme of section 8 (b) (1) (A).29 In an agency
shop situation, as existed in the present case, the choice of the em-
ployee is between paying dues and receiving a voice in union affairs
or paying dues without the right to select and guide union leader-
ship. The price of freedom from membership obligations is loss of
control of the bargaining representative. 0 In refusing to pay that
price the petitioners assumed the risk of internal discipline.31 The
principle of majority rule, inherent in the act, would be severely
o See, e.g., Margolis v. Burke, 53 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1945); United States Rub-
ber Co., & United Rubber Workers, 21 War Lab. Rep. 182 (1945). But see Mitchell
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961) (union may not expel a member for advocating right to work legisla-
tion), 1962 DuKE L.J. 468.
- A literal reading of the proviso can lead to no other interpretation since all
that is protected from impairment is the union right to prescribe rules with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. See note I supra. The Board
itself has argued that fines are merely steps in determining membership status. Allen
Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 1961).
"' Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553, 556 (1955).
2D See note 1 supra. The proviso is an added defense once a union act is found to
be restraining. If the union conduct was not restraining in the first instance, then
there is no need for a consideration of the effect of the proviso.
oNonetheless, the representative is under an obligation to represent the nonmem-
ber employee fairly. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1959), enforced, 284 F.2d
861 (2d Cir. 1960); GRODIN, UNION GOVERNMENT AND THE LAw 197 (1961); Comment,
4 B.C. IND. & Corist. L. Rav. 661, 675 (1963).
31 Freely entering into a union can only imply an assumption of the risks which
a reasonable man would normally expect to attach to union membership. Thus, the
case where the union attempts to enforce a bylaw which deprives members of civil
liberties can easily be distinguished. See Local 925, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
NLRB Release No. R-870 (June 25, 1962). "If the trade policy behind union discipline
conflicts with the law of the state ... the union policy must give way." GRODIN, Op.
cit. supra note 30, at 130.
Protection against union invasion of membership basic rights has been afforded by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.
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undermined if the petitioners or any other minority group were
allowed the privileges of membership without the attendant obliga-
tions.
The preferable approach, therefore, seems to be that of the con-
curring member who argued that in this agency shop context there
was no coercion because these employees subjected themselves to
the regulations and disciplines of union membership. 2 Analyzing
the problem in this manner raises the inference that if there had
been a union shop the charge of restraint would have been sus-
tained. 3  But, section 7 rights may be legally limited by a section
8 (a) (3) agreement requiring membership in a union.84 Had there
been less digression in both the majority and dissenting opinions
this case would have crystallized the issues for future controversies.
The question which, when answered authoritatively, may hold the
key to understanding the limitations on internal union pressures is
whether union shop agreements operate solely to force non-union
employees to contribute to a union's treasury or whether the mem-
bership referred to in section 8 (a) (3) includes coerced participation
in union activities.3 5
§ 401 (Supp. IV, 1959-1962). There is no indication that due process was not adhered
to in the enacting and enforcement of this by-law.
11 The case of a worker who joined the union and was then prevented from resign-
ing, as is possible under maintenance of membership contracts, was not considered.
However, one can infer from the tone of the concurring opinion that such an employee
would not be viewed as a volunteer. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. at 20388.
83 The majority would not consider the addition of a union shop security clause
as material, since by their reasoning the fines and the suit for enforcement were not
intended to be proscribed by § 8 (b) (1) (A) and, in any case, were exempted by the
proviso.
The dissenting member argues that an agency shop is the substantial equivalent
of the union shop. "[Tlhe contract provisions left so little to choice that, as a practical
matter, the employees were compelled to join the union .. " 4 CCH LAB. L. RaP.
at 20389 n.19. Cf. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963)
(Florida ban on agency shop upheld).
3, "[N]othing in this subchapter ... shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization . .. to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirtieth day ..... Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1958).
8r Compare Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), and NLRB v.
Biscuit & Cracker Workers, 222 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1955), and Union Starch & Ref. Co.,
87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), with Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373
U.S. 690 (1963), and NLRB v. Clara-Val Packing Co., 191 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1951).
The controversy between the broad and narrow readings of § 8 (a) (3) points out
the fallacy of viewing the agency shop as merely a form of compulsory unionism.
Contra, authorities cited note 33 supra. The limitation on § 7 rights, see note 1 supra,
will be meaningless if a union must abandon all restrictions which might otherwise be
fairly placed on members in order to collect a service fee from the nonmember
employee.
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